The Geopolitical Effects of Turkey’s Diaspora: An International Perspective

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Abstract

This paper provides a conceptual theoretical review of the multiple aspects of Turkey’s diaspora. The analysis of the geopolitical influence of Turkey’s diaspora reveals a complex geopolitical mosaic, which is often a combination of many different diaspora. A political analysis of Turkey’s diaspora would include the consideration of internationalization, investment, expansion, and remittance transfers from the destination country to Turkey. This paper informs us of some of the political determinants that have influenced present-day Turkish diaspora since the year 2000. For example, Turkey’s transition from an inward-oriented to an outward-oriented economy, reinforced by financial liberalization legislation in the early 2000s. This paper discusses the effect of eicktivism, a social actor, which has enabled the political mobilization of a significant proportion of Turkey’s diaspora. The countries providing the most outward migration flows from Turkey are identified e.g., Albania and Montenegro. There are also positive reasons why a significant number of Turkish citizens have chosen to leave their birth land. The paper discusses the educational, business, socio-economic, and cultural reasons why people from Turkey now form part of the Turkish diaspora.

Keywords: Turkey’s diaspora, integration, soft power, eicktivism, political mobilization

Introduction

The paper uses literary material and grey literature from numerous sources to describe the socio-historical tapestry of Turkey’s diasporic
movements and to analyze the hypothesis that Turkey's diasporic policy in the early 2020s, which is based on three primary pillars: politics, culture, and the economy, is beset by multiple challenges. In the long term, Turkey's policy toward its many international diasporic communities will prove to be correct. The causal factors that significantly influence the formation and continuation of Turkish diaspora population are identified, e.g., domestic repression of ethnic, political, or religious groups (Charalambous, 2019; Freedom in the World (FITW), 2019; Ozaltin, Shakir, & Loizides, 2019, p. 81). More positive reasons, are the demand for live Turkish music and theatre performers to reside in a different country (Levin Institute, 2017; Musically, 2019).

This paper is presented in five sections. Definitions of diaspora are multiple, complex, and contested. For example, from a social perspective we are informed as follows:

Within IOM, the term diaspora is used interchangeably with transnational communities. Both terms refer to migrants or descendants of migrants, whose identity and sense of belonging have been shaped by their migration experience and background. (International Organization for Migration (IOM), 2018, p. 305)

At this early juncture it is important to highlight that this discussion pertains to diasporic communities, and not forcibly displaced people. Forced migration can occur for reasons of development, exploitation, or persecution, or because the home country has become physically or socially inhospitable (See for example Tsourapas, 2019, p. 3).

The study Cartographies of Diaspora by Brah (1996) identifies that travelling for the purpose of labor is an aspect to be considered in the study of diaspora. Similarly, a traumatic event, such as Idi Amin's rise to power in Uganda is another aspect that needs to be considered as well. Brah's (1996) concept of "diaspora space," as opposed to just the study of diaspora resonates in later studies. Diaspora space considers the
psycho-social landscape inhabited by diaspora population alongside indigenous people, which is essentially socially constructed by the dominant ideology.

It is a central argument of this text that “diaspora space” (as distinct from the concept of diaspora) is inhabited not only by diaspora subjects, but equally by those who are constructed and represented as “indigenous.” As such, the concept of diasporic space foregrounds the entanglement of genealogies of dispersion with those of “staying put.”

(Brah, 1996, p. 181)

Brah (1996, p. 181) indicates that the concept of diaspora, provides psycho-social markers for the analysis of people, information, cultures, commodities, and capital. These latter constituents also represent the essential building blocks of business ventures. They demonstrate how diasporic communities have a significant geopolitical effect when they have investments in the host country.

Cohen’s (2008) Global Diasporas study provides a useful generic introduction, informing us of the many complexities of diasporic populations. People inevitably consider the peace and security aspects of diaspora communities, without ever considering who decided this narrative. There are five types of diaspora: “victim, labor, trade, imperial, and cultural diaspora” (Cohen, 2008, pp. x–xi). Diasporic communities should be analyzed in terms of their individual awareness and their means of life. In practice this means that to understand diaspora, one needs to study the social and cultural changes that occurred during and after migration (Cohen, 2008, p. 21). Cohen’s (2008) theories inform the reader that, as the political economic and social landscape in individual countries differ, diasporic communities from the same country will have different lived experiences from one country compared to another. For example, there could be higher gender bias or racial inequality, in one country than another on the same continent. Diasporic people might be forced
to live in one area of the city; whereas migrant populations could be more welcomed, being allowed to integrate in a different host city. The lived experiences of diasporic communities also affect consciousness, a progressive social landscape could lead to digital political mobilization. This is especially true when the diaspora find they have much more academic, employment, and religious freedom in their host country. A far cry compared to the reasons why they left their homeland country in the first place. Thus Cohen’s (2008) study describes the main causal factors, which influence the geopolitical effect of a country’s diaspora, in our case Turkey.

Koinova (2010) in her *Diasporas and international politics* study, explains how a country’s diaspora can champion the cause of their homeland. “Diasporas use institutions of their host state to advocate causes for their home state” (Koinova, 2010, p. 150). Diasporic communities interacting with home institutions is a sure sign of diaspora socially integrating and conforming to local customs. During the Anthropocene globalization phase we are living in, diaspora people are associated with many political initiatives, accessing cheap communication and transport. Due to this technological era, political mobilization can be affected without the diaspora leaving their living room. The basic ingredients to participate in technological political activism, tech-pol, or clicktivism, were in place by 2010.

Diasporic communities are mosaic in their make-up, having the ability to pursue competing political agendas, without falling apart or stagnating. This gives diaspora a geopolitical utility not enjoyed by other social actors. They have a familial connection to kin in their homeland, however, they have often travelled for employment reasons or to oversee considerable investments. Once in situ in the host country, diaspora can integrate with local people, businesses, and eventually dignitaries, for both commercial and political purposes (Koinova, 2010, p. 151).

Turkey has one of the highest diaspora rates in the world as measured by emigration completions (Mencutek & Baser, 2018, p. 86; see also IEP Global Peace Index 2019, p. 15). Emigration is where a country’s
citizens travel to a destination state and remain in that nation state for any variety of reasons e.g., family life. Akcay and Alimuhammad (2013, p. 103) provide a pre-cursor to considering the political effects of diaspora, as opposed to solely from an academic perspective. "However, we should note, diaspora carries nowadays mainly political rather than academic meaning" (Akcay & Alimuhammad, 2013, p. 106). Gafarli (2014, p. 176) informs us that diaspora was discussed from a deportation aspect, although the more contemporary definition is from a voluntary immigration view. The paper uses the Emigrant Policies Index (EMIX) framework as described by Pedrosa and Palop-Garcia (2017, p. 165), as a critical lens to conduct a conceptual theoretical review of Turkey's diaspora. The policy subcomponents are: citizenship, suffrage, political competition, institutional participation, economic policies, obligations, cultural, exit and transit policies, social policies, and symbolic policies (Pedrosa & Palop-Garcia, 2017, pp. 169-170). Pedrosa and Palop-Garcia's (2017, p. 165) Diaspora policies in comparison study, is informed by the "active and supplementary variables" described in Regazzi's (2014) earlier work, A comparative analysis of diaspora policies. These variables are: symbolic policies, religious and cultural policies, social and economic policies, citizenship policies, state and bureaucratic control, structural-instrumental hypotheses, ethnic affiliation hypothesis, and governmentality hypothesis (Regazzi, 2014, pp. 77-78). Social and symbolic citizenship are mirrored in both typologies. Their inclusion underlines the degree of theoretical alignment between Regazzi (2014, p. 74) and Pedrosa and Palop-Garcia (2017, p. 165), in discussing the effect of diaspora policies.

The first section discusses the history of Turkey's diaspora, analyzing post war historical reasons why tranches of the Turkish diaspora are at various global locations. Section two discusses the geopolitical influence of Turkey's diaspora in terms of internationalization, corporatism, and Turkish soft power. The second section identifies the countries where most Turkish diaspora now reside. Turkish Circassian diaspora, originally from the North Caucasus region of Turkey, now have a significant pres-
ence in parts of Russia (Kaya, 2014, p. 51). Due to a contemporary Turkish foreign policy, the geopolitical influence of Turkey’s Circassian diaspora may now be shrinking (Gafarli, 2014, p. 171). Analysis is provided to contextualize and identify the social actors that have shaped Turkey’s diaspora in the new millennium. For example, natural disasters. Turkey had five large earthquakes in August and November 1999, May 2003, October 2011 and October 2020. Section three and four provide a parallel tapestry of the main causal factors that have engendered Turkish diaspora in recent years. The third section provides a critical overview of local and national politics in Turkey. Section three discusses some negative aspects of the politics in Turkey and their effect upon the diaspora people, as reported by the epistemic community (FITW, 2019, p. 6). The fourth section discusses the positive aspects of Turkey’s diaspora. For example, Turkey is recognized by some observers as a model Muslim country, adopting westernization, democratization, and secularism (Ayhan, 2018, p. 57; Balci & Liles, 2019). Other positive aspects of the Turkish diaspora are manifest in the macro and microeconomic benefits of exporting Turkey’s music, art, and theatre.

Pratt (2007, p. 7) explains how a sociological phenomenon called transculturation, replicates structural power relationships to the extent that they control what is recognized and accepted. With transculturation, weak marginalized groups such as the Turkish diaspora, travelling through foreign lands would have been influenced by the local dominant ideology. When the Turkish diaspora people settled in these countries, they would recreate their own art and music using the materials around them. This would include the physical resources to make running repairs, in additions to the social materials from the interaction with the host country’s native people. Some of this interaction would be welcome, however, some would be the dominant ideology of the day being imposed upon the marginalized Turkish diaspora. The structural inequality would be manifest, partly in the form of agenda setting. Here the dominant group would decide the type of which was allowed to be performed. However, transculturation is not completely a one-sided process; marginalized people “do determine
to varying extents, what they absorb into their own, how they use it, and what they make it mean" (Pratt, 2007, p. 7). This aspect of transculturation is significant when analyzing the geopolitical effect of Turkey’s diaspora. Kaya (2002, p. 43) provides another interpretation of transculturation where the Turkish diaspora subconsciously adopts local customs. The mention of adopting local customs is important in this discussion, because, by adopting local practices, Turkish diasporic communities demonstrate that they are outward looking and willing to engage with their host country. This helps in community integration, building relationships, forming political allegiances, and practicing local customs that elevates the status of the Turkish diaspora.

Kaya (2002, p. 43) describes how a process of transculturation can result in a feeling of double diasporic consciousness. Transculturation can be defined as mixing the musical styles -of two different countries. Double diasporic consciousness can be defined, as an effective assimilation of the diasporic population’s own mother culture, with their destination country’s customs. (Gilroy, 1987, p. 37; see also Kaya, 2002, p. 60, who cites a Gilroy reinterpretation). Section four identifies how Turkey’s diaspora has an under-theorized geopolitical role regarding Turkish ethnic minority cultures. The Turkish diaspora can help to retain ancient culture and rituals, which could be permanently erased by the political turmoil in their native homeland of Turkey. There is an analysis of various aspects of the interface between Muslim hood and modernity by millennial Turkish diaspora. The paper concludes with section five, providing a critical theoretical overview of Turkey’s diaspora. The fifth section acts to summarize and recap the main issues that arose from the literature search. Turkey’s geopolitical importance to both the European Union (EU) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) are reinforced. The importance of the export of Turkish culture by Turkey’s diaspora is underscored. There is a growing demand for Turkey’s artistic culture in global markets, making a small contribution to Turkey’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP). At the micro level an unintended consequence of Turkey’s diaspora, is that it protects the Turkish
cultural identity from eradication by internal domestic forces. The conclusion highlights a few theoretical and political insights resulting from the analysis and the dichotomy of diasporic communities, which has been identified and disentangled.

The Recent History of Turkey's Diaspora from 2000 to Present Day

The Turkish diaspora is a large mosaic of the citizens of Turkey, they are multiple populations residing in many different countries globally. Turkey's diaspora consists of Turkish nationals who have migrated from Turkey and former Ottoman territories. Numerous countries have been recognized as once being a part of the Ottoman Empire, which existed from 1299 to 1923, a period of over 620 years (Turkish Cultural Foundation, 2019). These countries include but are not limited to: Albania, Algeria, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Egypt, Greece, Herzegovina, Iraq (formerly Mesopotamia), Italian North Africa, Palestine, Romania, Serbia, Syria, Tunisia, and Turkey. An important aspect of the diaspora is established by the length of Turkey's contribution, some 720 years from 1299 to 2019.

The current Turkish diaspora came about mainly by economic forces, a manifestation of the supply and demand of an additional workforce in the 1960s. Germany led the way in recruiting Turkish immigrant workers, whose numbers increased exponentially from the early 1960s to the early 1970s. Many other Turkish workers were recruited throughout most of Europe and Scandinavia during the boom in the post-war '60s period. What began initially as the migration of temporary workers, became more permanent during the European economic downturn of the 1970s. Turkish citizens continued to migrate for family formation or reunification reasons. Another policy driver was the 1980 coup d'état in Turkey and the Kurdish conflict later in the same decade. This led to the formation of the Turkish diaspora for political as well as labor reasons (Aydin & Østergaard-Nielsen, 2020, p. 402). There is a significant population of
the Turkish diaspora in the US, standing at some 230,377 people, however
the largest diasporic communities have migrated to European countries.
“Today, the highest number of Turkish residents reside in Germany
(3,081,113), France (649,482), the Netherlands (396,555), Austria
(279,390) and Belgium (269,861)” (Aydin & Østergaard-Nielsen, 2020,
p. 402).

Any nations’ diaspora must be able to integrate and become assimilated to gain a foothold in a destination country. Hall (2017) argues, a country’s diaspora must be able “to transform the achievements of other cultures...into something radically new” (Nakou, 2017, interview with Edith Hall). McManus (2018a, p. 9) indicates how football has been useful in assisting Turkey’s diaspora to both integrate into host societies, and help retain a sense of national identity. McManus (2018b, p. 762) articulates a dichotomy of diasporic properties of sport in facilitating integration. One branch of the dichotomy is transculturation, with the enjoyment of sport being enhanced by appreciating multi-cultures, e.g., the achievements of Federer or Nadal. The other side of sport is the joint support of the national team, enabling social and cultural development between the indigenous population and diasporic communities. Ercilasun and Ercilasun (2018, p. 3) indicate how caravanning was a core component in the development trajectory of China’s one belt silk road. The Chinese government has expressed an intention for their Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to pass through Armenia. The Turkish diaspora in the form of members of the Uyghur community, will also benefit from China’s BRI (Atli, 2019). Dreyfer (FPRI, 2019) alerts us that Uyghur Turkish diaspora living in China, are experiencing significant discrimination. Discrimination manifest by Chinese state sponsored social policies, which when enacted meet the threshold of being human rights abuses. Dreyfer (2019) articulates the effect of some of China’s policies on the Uyghur community in China. “Uyghurs, the titular nationality of the so-called Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), found the use of their language constrained, beards proscribed, family planning limits imposed, and young people prohibited from visiting mosques”
(Dreyfer, 2019).

The reintegration of the Turkish diaspora, who have returned to their birth land, is another important facet in the history of Turkey’s diaspora. Such populations have been viewed as ethnic minorities by other Turkish citizens who have never left Turkey. This has created ethnic-cultural and ethno-political tensions, including allegations of discrimination and structural ghettoization in some areas of Turkey e.g., the Armenian region. Turkish regional examples include Nakh ethnic citizens in Mardin, Sivas, and Mus. These are said to be areas where domestic repression of ethnic, political, or religious groups have recently taken place. There are also Ossetian ethnic people in Kars and Rozgat (See Gurini, 2019). The EU demonstrates its strategic role as a supranational actor, by using conditionality clauses in trying to reduce Turkish minority discrimination. The importance of (re)integration for both returning and already present Turkish diaspora becomes clearly apparent, when considering Turkey’s application for EU membership. Kaya’s (2014) observation, acts to underscore how critical the EU’s soft power is in disseminating cultural diversity.

As can clearly be seen in the Accession Partnership text, accepted on April 14, 2003, by the Council of Europe, which maps out Turkey’s obligations during its integration into the EU, “cultural diversity” has replaced “minority” in order to celebrate “unity in diversity.”

(Kaya, 2014, p. 55, emphasis added)

Turkey begun preliminary work on what is now known as the GAP project, by 2002 if not earlier (All About Turkey, 2019; UNDP Project Document, 2009, p. 14). The GAP (Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi) project is a sustainable development initiative, specifically targeted for the Southeast Anatolia region of Turkey. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) document informs us that the implementation phase of the GAP project began in April 2009 (UNDP, 2009, p. 2). The ongoing
environmental work contained in the UNDP will improve the socio-economic conditions for Turkish diasporic communities. There is an emphasis on entrepreneurship, creativity, and innovation, in how sustainable environment developments can be delivered. The Turkish diaspora living in the Southeast Anatolia region, are engaging in the GAP project as members of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) (International Crisis Project, 2010, p. 7). Amongst Turkey’s diaspora are Turkish millennials, who have key consultation and monitoring roles. They bring a tech savvy utility to civil society organizations (CSOs), by helping to mitigate the effects of community polarization and a lack of diversity (Ertukel, 2019, p. 1). These millennial Turkish diasporas will be able to liaise on an intergenerational basis, by assisting older members of ethnic minority groups to engage. Participation has taken place to lower the digital divide and in multi-faith events. These young Turkish millennials will also be able to provide a non-sectarian, or faith based practical approach, to community participation in group sessions online. The development work done after the May 2009 defeat of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the Tamil Tigers, underlines the need for community cohesion. Social and economic process must be formulated by political processes, in which minority groups are fully represented and listened to. The UNDP focus on working with Turkey, to ensure that minority groups benefit from the GAP project expenditure is clearly beneficial. The UNDP’s inclusion of ‘Institutional Capacity Building’ and ‘Institutional Needs Assessments’ in 2019, acts to underscore the community cohesion aspects of the International Crisis Project 2010 report (UNDP, 2009, pp. 21–22). The Turkish government’s 2019 appraisal of the GAP project implementation, identifies the need for minority (diaspora) group stakeholder involvement. In recent times, the World Bank (2019a) mirrored the position of the International Crisis Project (2010) and the UNDP (2009). There is multi-agency policy harmonization, which ensures that social environmental development schemes must include community consultations and stewardship with diasporic communities. This acts as a precursor to the problem-solving multi-scalar approach required, to com-
plete the ongoing political tasks that Turkey needs to deliver (Cordesman, 2019, p. 3; Green, 2016, p. 4).

**Geopolitical Influence of Turkey’s Diaspora**

Turkey is blessed by a geographical position globally, being the main land bridge between the USA, Russia, European countries, and the Middle East (Kamrava, 2017, p. 2; Sagi & Engelberth, 2018, p. 16). By obtaining a lease on the strategic Red Sea island of Suakin, Turkey increased its maritime presence away from its own coastline (GIS Reports, 2018). Karasik and Cañiero’s (Middle East Institute, 17 January 2018) view that Turkey intends to build a military base on Suakin; or allow an ally to do so, will eventually come to fruition. Turkey’s relative proximity with China, which is expected to overtake the USA economically by 2030, also increases Turkey’s geopolitical influence (Clark, 2019). Due to the interlinked nature of geopolitical relationships generally, the greatest powers have learnt that they cannot enact successful foreign policy globally without Turkish support. Very clearly, the EU would like Turkey to become an EU member state, despite its longstanding non-compliance with the Copenhagen criteria pausing Turkey’s EU accession (European Parliament, 2019, p. 3). Turkey is a NATO ally, mainly due to its strategic geographical position between the great Western powers and the Middle East. Turkey also has the second largest standing army in NATO (Forces.net, 2020). Turkey’s soft power is evident in the development of schools by the Turkish diaspora in Europe, the USA, Central Asia, and East Africa. Turkey is also building mosques in Latin American countries and sub-Saharan Africa, in addition to financing religious education of the Islamic Muslim faith (Tol, 2019). Reports suggest Turkey will continue to deliver major development projects overseas (Rogers, 2019, p. 44; Garrie, 2019).

Turkey’s “mosque diplomacy” is driven by the concept of soft power, a term coined by Joseph Nye who argued that a country’s
strength is derived not only from its military and economic might but also from its culture and international image.

(Cengiz, 2018)

Turkey continues to pursue Ahmet Davutoğlu’s “zero problems with neighbors” foreign policy, in the face of ever-growing challenging circumstances (Balci & Liles, 2019; Falk, 2012). The Turkish government has engaged in conflict ending talks with Kurdish terrorist groups, and is in talks to unify Cyprus. Here Turkey is one of the few external countries to recognize the island of Cyprus as a single entity. Turkey’s geopolitical influence is underscored by its invitation to participate in mediation talks between Israel and Syria, up to the 2011 Syrian war. Reconciliation with Armenia regarding competing narratives of the events in 1915 event have proved intractable thus far, but at least there have been diplomatic discussions. Construction projects and energy deals with Russia have reinforced Turkey’s soft power (Kamrava, 2017, p. 6). These are geopolitical commercial successes are proving to be something of an annoyance to the US, the EU, and to a lesser extent China. The recent Russian arms deal for the S-400 missile defense system, resulted in a negative reaction from both NATO and the US administration (Erdemir, 2019; World Geostrategic Insights, 2018). Turkey’s UN Security Council sanction busting the 2010 support of the nuclear deal with Iran warrants pause for thought. The ramifications of this geopolitical support of Iran are still reverberating in the 2020s (Borger, 2020; Wintour, 2020).

Turkish diasporic communities help Turkey in improving its domestic laws on real estate, including property acquisition by foreign nationals and investment companies. Nation states have been implementing several legislations to ensure that companies that are more than 50% foreign owned, are scrutinized by the state. Due to the success of Turkish nationals in foreign countries, there has been policy transfer which has manifest itself in numerous ways (Ünlühisarcıklı, 2019, p. 2). Firm internationalization has shown a small amount of policy convergence on issues such as employing immigrants and business acquisition legislation
(Kunczer, Lidner & Puck, 2019, p. 358).

Budenbender and Golubchikov’s (2017, p. 75) study, “The geopolitics of real estate” inform us of the effect of diaspora buying and selling property. At the micro level, a nation state amasses soft power when its diaspora acquires real estate abroad, affecting the domestic market of the host nation. The profits realized from the sale of property boosts the disposable income of Turkey’s diasporic community in the foreign country’s local economy. Independently wealthy Turkish foreigners have a significant political, social, and economic effect on their local communities. They send large remittances back to any family they have back home in Turkey. At the macro level, international observers are able to detect how commercial projects being completed by the Turkish diaspora led partnerships are enhancing Turkey’s soft power (See ICMPD, 2019).

The socio-economic effect of diasporic communities buying real estate in their destination country, delineates the multiple geopolitical effects of property acquisition (Caglayan, 2019). There is a significant element of internationalization of real estate, which is made complex by the interaction with a variety of state and non-state social actors. The buying and selling of real estate, especially commercial property by diaspora people, often involves local legal administrators. If the property purchased is a factory, then consultants, researchers, and scientists may be required to complete the manufacturing processes. This may result in foreign nationals being drawn to the host country for employment (Kenny, Reddan, & Geraghty, 2018). This creates a diasporic community that needs to be housed, children who must be educated, and a need for general healthcare. It can be argued that diasporic communities are a societal driver towards policy convergence to enhance the supply of social goods. Examples are initiatives to increase public health by ensuring the provision of clean air or water (Neagu & Teodoru, 2019, p. 19). We can therefore infer that there is an effect upon the social infrastructure of the host destination country, caused by foreign nationals purchasing domestic properties. The media can become involved in providing an
independent analysis of the local effect of diasporic communities on commerce, employment, and politics, thereby demonstrating Turkey’s soft power (Budenbender & Golubchikov, 2017, p. 88). “[…] the internationalization of real estate interplays with and redefines contemporary geopolitics and how the latter is made more complex as a result, involving actors and discourses that can sit inside but also outside formal state institutions” (Budenbender & Golubchikov, 2017, p. 76).

The discussion on the internationalization of real estate introduces another facet of soft power, that of public diplomacy. The effect of domestic property acquisition by Turkey’s diaspora on communities in the host countries, is relatively insignificant at the local level. There are international mega projects with a significant, albeit, sometimes controlling Turkish interests to consider. These large projects, often have government involvement working to convey a positive image as part of a new public diplomacy (Ayhan, 2018, p. 46). The direction of the Turkish government towards public diplomacy, has been clear for some time. It is a logical extension of the foreign policies introduced by Turkey’s former Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, such as the “zero problems with neighbors” and “strategic depth” 2009 foreign policies.

In January 2010, the establishment of the “Office of Public Diplomacy” was announced by Prime Minister Erdogan because the new government emphasized on the importance of public diplomacy as a key element to increase positive image of Turkey in international arena. The main task of this office was to “provide cooperation and coordination between public agencies and non-governmental organization in their activities related to public diplomacy.”

(Huijgh & Warlick, 2016, p. 20)

One area where public diplomacy could be of significance to Turkey’s diaspora, is how the Turkish government responds when an international crisis develops. Potentially, domestic, and international ob-
servers could perceive a lack of support for Turkish diasporic communities in times of crisis as geopolitical policy failure. Such a perception would act to derail the main task of the “Office of Public Diplomacy” as articulated by Huijgh and Warlick (2016, p. 20). Examples include unnecessary delay or failure to repatriate Turkish citizens in war torn countries, e.g., the Boko Haram insurgency or the Yemeni crisis. Similarly, being too slow in rescuing members of Turkey’s diasporic communities after an earthquake, e.g., the earthquakes in Chile, Haiti, or Pakistan. When responding to the latter crisis, Turkey’s approach utilizing “cooperation and coordination” with NGOs, was clearly a critical element of public diplomacy. Both politically and operationally, local NGOs in host countries will provide their service to people affected by an earthquake. Establishing links with such groups is of paramount importance to the Turkish government’s public diplomacy plans. Turkey must have multiple networks and contacts with local NGOs to ensure it is able to present an image that is it is supportive of Turkish nationals abroad. Once effective working relationships have been established, Turkish humanitarian aid like tents, food, medicines, and heating fuel can be disbursed by local NGOs. This can provide effective and on-the-ground practical support to all in need, including Turkish diasporic communities and functioned as an effective stopgap until Turkish aid arrived to repatriate members of Turkey’s diaspora choosing to return home to escape the aftermath of the earthquake. Turkey’s soft power will be enhanced, when independent international observers and the media publish their accounts of the Turkish government’s response. The potential for Turkey’s embarrassment due to clear geopolitical failure, in not protecting its diasporic communities abroad in times of crisis has been averted.

Addressing migrant representatives on June 16, 2013, Prime Minister Erdogan stated that Turkey has become a powerful and ambitious country, which now sets itself higher goals than before. As Turkey gains a greater say in world affairs, it now bears a greater responsibility protecting its citizens abroad including kin communities. Similarly, Foreign Minister
Ahmet Davutoğlu noted that Turkey is a strong country that not only deals with its domestic problems but also with issues around the world. Being a world power requires taking care of its citizens abroad. He added, “This ancient nation will respond to the call of its kin, its relatives about every issue in every place... Turkey broke the chain that slowed it down, no-one can stop Turkey.” (Mencutek & Baser, 2018, p. 97)

Counterproductive Effects of Turkey’s International Politics on the Turkish Diaspora

The definition of diasporization provided by Akçay and Alimuhammadov (2013, p. 103) serves to illustrate how little control the homeland country has over its diasporic communities. “Diasporization is the process of recognition and use of the minority group by the home country with another country where the authority of the sending country is absent” (Akçay & Alimuhammadov, 2013, pp. 107–108). The Turkish diaspora can have a negative effect upon the peace and political stability of Turkey in multiple ways. Some of the issues discussed will be considered from a “failing forward” standpoint (Lavanex, 2018, p. 1198). The geopolitical ramifications of the diaspora from Turkey are potentially quite profound. For example, “2,867,858 Turkish citizens living abroad were eligible to vote in the 2015 [Turkey] elections...” (Adamson, 2019, p. 11). In European Union (EU) member states, the Turkish diaspora with electoral rights in European elections, could vote primarily for Turkey’s interests (Akçay & Alimuhammadov, 2013, pp. 112–113). Some observers perceive such voting behavior, as not being compatible with free and fair elections. Destination countries where diaspora from Turkey have settled, may become more reluctant to provide Turkish nationals with a second visa or passport. The Turkish diaspora often have the right to vote in elections for the leadership of Turkey, in addition to voting rights in their destination country. “At this point one should keep in mind that most Turkey-originated diaspora members are either dual citizens or hold permanent residence in these countries” (Ozturk & Gozaydin,
2018, cited in Ozturk, 2018, p. 8). Psephology analysis established that globally, three million Turkish expats voted for Recep Tayyip Erdogan in the June 2018 Presidential elections. In some destination countries, an additional influx of Turkish diaspora can tip an already sensitive ethno-political balance in a manner unwelcomed by the host country (Wood, 2019). Undoubtedly, Turkey’s diaspora does have a substantial political influence, internationally, in their destination country.

Today, 1.2 million Turkish nationals are eligible to vote in Turkish elections. The sheer numbers involved have made this community a center of attraction in Turkish politics. In other words, the Turkish diaspora has become an indispensable element for Ankara, not only in the service of its bilateral relations with Berlin, but also for its domestic policy.

(Aydin, 2019, p. 1)

The business position taken by various sections of Turkey’s diaspora has global and national resonance. On the one hand Turkey is disadvantaged by a downgraded Lira, making economic growth and sustainability problematical (Pierini, 2019, p. 2). In addition, the devaluated Lira places great pressure on Turkey’s ability to sustain the social infrastructure required to protect its people. These domestic and economic problems that plague Turkey, makes moving business abroad appear a distinctly more attractive proposition. On the other hand, destination countries wanting to attract entrepreneurial Turkish nationals provide business incentives, which increases Turkey’s diaspora. Albania and Montenegro are prime examples of host countries who deliver start-up initiatives, designed to specifically target Turkish businesses (Buyuk, Clapp, & Haxhiaj, 2019). The Turkish government works in collaboration with the IOM and UNHCR, in providing start-up projects for Syrian refugees (UNCTAD, UNHCR & IOM, 2018, p. 65). Turkish support of Syrian refugees when possible by the government is an example of soft power. Other countries may view Turkey as a tolerant, reforming nation state,
which would assist in the integration of the Turkish diasporic population by their host communities. In this sense, there is a positive geopolitical effect of both the Turkish government and Turkish diasporic communities. Turkey’s business diaspora is effective in building businesses, way beyond Turkey’s international borders.

An integral part of businesses anywhere in this era of globalization is information technology (IT), in the form of internet accessibility and usage. Immediately, one needs to factor in the social actor clicktivism, which has increased and changed the nature of political participation (Giglou, d’Haenens, & Ogan, 2017, p. 549; Zihnioglu, 2017; See also Kaya, 2014, p. 60). Turkey’s ongoing business economic development and sustainability agenda needs to address the critical issues regarding Turkey’s internet infrastructure quickly. Internet development is vital to restore the Turkish economy, in citizenship engagement work, to operationalize environmental and the Turkish diaspora’s sustainability (MD Staff, 2019; Simon, Griffiths, & Nagendra, 2018, p. 148).

Clicktivism is the later version of digital political activity, which originated from campaign work circulated by technologically savvy people on the internet. This was political activism carried out by earlier social actors called “techno-political nerds,” quickly shortened to ‘tech-pol nerds’ (Postill, 2018, p. 1). Tech-pol activists such as Assange were responsible for leaking some important information, which various governments and large corporations did not want the public to see. The work of tech-pol activists paved the way for political action to address cronyism and democratization initiatives to protect freedom of speech. Postill’s (2018) description of tech-pol nerds, underlines this social actor’s contribution to political mobilization, on a group or individual basis. From the direct-action hacking or leaking works of technologically savvy tech-pol activism, the more mainstream political campaigning work of clicktivism was born. Postill’s (2018) tech-pol work, serves to illustrate how clicktivism has enabled the Turkish diaspora to become geopolitically important in their home and host countries.
In this book I argue that tech-pol-nerds operate in a highly
dynamic “social world” (Strauss, 1978) that intersects multiple
other social worlds, including politics, culture, and business.
This is a world divided into four main sub worlds (or spaces):
data activism, digital rights, social protest, and formal politics.”
(Postill, 2018, p. 4)

Clicktivism is an important consideration regarding any diasporic
community including Turkey’s diasporic community, because political
and social mobilization on the internet works both ways. Websites, blogs,
vlogs can be accessed on various social network digital platforms, which
can present political messages for or against Turkey’s government
(Giglou et al., 2017, p. 548; McAuliffe, Kitimbo, Goosens, & Ullah,

The other side of the coin will be the dynamics of trans-territorial-
ity that have one old protagonist – diasporas – and one newer
one – social networks and digital platforms. Even as physical
borders are erected, the circulation of ideas and information will
grow, generating new (inter)cultural dynamics and, on occa-
sions, political and social mobilization.

(Lecha, 2018, p. 5)\textsuperscript{12}

Clicktivism poses a critical question, which is relevant to some of
Turkey’s diaspora: Are there any factors motivating people to politically
participate online, but not to be active on the streets? (CIA, 2019). Turkish
diaspora in far flung countries that are globally away from Turkey’s bor-
ders, can disseminate or receive an alternative narrative to that favored
by the state. This could be on the historical, cultural, and socio-economic
background of geopolitically sensitive issues, which are hotly contested.
For example, there are competing narratives regarding the Armenian
Genocide; Gezi Park and the Taksim Square protests; Greece and
Turkey’s position regarding the separation of Cyprus; or the Syrian
Conflict (Giglou et al., 2017, p. 549). The perception of state sponsored surveillance, if not the outright suppression of Gülen sympathizers within Turkey does take place, and impedes Turkey’s international progress (FITW, 2019, p. 5).

Domestically in part due to diasporic communities from other countries, there is an ongoing process of urbanization in Turkey. An analysis of Turkish urbanization reveals that two important features—minorities and identity—operate incipiently in the background (Kaymaz, 2013, p. 742). Hidden aspects of urbanization have been revealed, like ghettoization, which manifest as areas where minority groups live experiencing less street cleaning and policing. There have been initiatives to engender Turkish citizenship buy-in of the government’s agenda during 2018–2019, however they have been sporadic. There has been little sense of the Turkish government’s impetus to consult with all of its population. Independent observers feel that Turkey’s urbanization processes have helped reveal that certain diasporic communities are being excluded. “Therefore Kurdish, Alevite or Assyrian are not included in the state-diasporic nexus, despite the fact that bureaucrats constantly make declarations that they are trying to reach wider audiences” (Mencutek & Baser, 2018, p. 100). There have been some human rights concerns, which can be described as discrimination against minority groups. These include evidence of structural barriers impeding the development of social movements and local government in Turkey (See Human Rights Watch, 2019, p. 9). NGO websites in Turkey indicate that certain groups, in terms of religious practice or LGBT activity, are being excluded from employment or elected office (ICNL & TUSEV, 2019). International studies voice concerns that Turkey’s migration policy is perceived to exacerbate modern slavery (Christ & Burritt, 2018, p. 103).13) People who are not recognized by Turkey as migrants, are forced to enter neighboring countries illegally. Often illegal migrants face modern slavery, being forced to work on farms as fruit pickers, or as sex workers (Makovsky, 2019, p. 1914; Sasnal, 2018; UNHCR, 2019, p. 34).
Positive Effects of Turkey’s International Politics on Turkish Diasporic Communities

A policy restatement acts as an aide memoir of what Turkey’s government intends to achieve in the long term. The transnational aspects of Turkey’s migration policy, should result in returning Turkish nationals who have new skills and internationally recognized qualifications. These Turkish diaspora people, “guest workers” (Aydin, 2016, p. 5) in host countries, will help alleviate the chronic shortage of skilled workers in Turkey. “As it currently stands, Turkey’s policy is based upon three primary pillars: politics, culture, and economy” (Aydin, 2019, p. 2). This in part harmonizes with Pedrosa and Palop-Garcia’s (2017, p. 166) EMIX framework, and Regazzi’s (2014) “active and supplementary variables” work. Turkey’s diaspora policy underscores that politics, culture, and economy, represent the troika of underpinning social infrastructure required to encourage the embedded diasporic people to return.

March 20, 2019 was the third anniversary of the Turkey-European Union migration agreement (Lecha, 2018, p. 7). Both parties benefited from the reduction in Turkey to Greece migration. The agreement has led to a reduction in the perception of a Turkish refugee crisis in Greece, an EU member state. Slow incremental steps towards completing EU accession are manifest in the ongoing diplomatic work to improve relations between Turkey and Germany. In late 2018, Turkish religious and cultural diaspora opened a large Mosque in Cologne, which was partly funded by the German government (Ozturk, 2019). The Turkish government mobilized Turkey’s diaspora to act as lobbyists (Aydin, 2019, p. 2). There is a diasporic duality, manifest as kin communities, e.g., Turkish university students being perceived by Turkey’s government as elite. This is because the Turkish government views certain members of their international diaspora, as having both an overseas investment and a global lobbying utility. Cultural connections act as a crucial diplomatic bridge between Turkey’s diaspora and Germany, the doyen of the EU. “In this regard, the Turkish Islamic Union for Religious Affairs (Diyanet Isleri
Turk Islam Birli, DITIB), has emerged as the most influential body, consisting of 960 local communities' (Aydin, 2019, p. 3).

There is a clear indication that Turkey would like to liberalize the passport and visa rules for Turkish citizens travelling to and from EU member states (Pierini, 2019, p. 7). This would be beneficial for Turkey's small but widespread diaspora, who have a presence in many EU countries. There appears to have been little movement since Turkey submitted its work to the European Commission in February 2018 (European Commission, 2018, p. 3). In the 2010s, some Turkish CSOs were very effective in changing Turkey's domestic politics by delivering Turkish diaspora (re)integration initiatives.

In the last two years, this approach has secured significant legislative and legal victories for groups such as the Platform for the Elimination of Child Abuse, the Delegation for the Monitoring of Animal Rights, and the Federation of Consumers. It has also helped community-based organizations motivate state and private-sector actors to reverse actions harmful to wetlands and streams, ancient olive groves and historic settlements.

(Ertuksel, 2019, p. 1)

The relative success of the CSOs role in relation to Turkey's diaspora has resonance elsewhere. Many CSOs or community organizations are either heavily or solely reliant on volunteers. The amount and frequency in which a country's government or its population give to its charities requires consideration. This is because contributions either economically—in cash terms, or in kind—in the form of voluntary work, can be used as an indicator of that country's general wellbeing. Turkey performs poorly on the CAF (Charities Aid Foundation) World Giving Index (WGI) being ranked 131 (CAF WGI 2018, p. 9). There are numerous practical reasons why Turkey's populations give so little by way of charitable donations. There is the ongoing since from December 2011 Turkey Syrian War, a military campaign which has contributed to a devalued Lira.
Turkey is also buffeted by global fluctuations in oil process, resulting in temporary high costs of heating fuel. In addition, there is foreign currency income loss, when the prices of fossilized fuels fall. The domestic hardship caused by these factors amongst others, most of which are beyond Turkey's control, create a landscape conducive to additional charity giving. In the long-term Turkey's CAF WGI score will be assessed lower, indicating that the Turkish government and more of Turkey's citizens are assisting charities. Initiatives conducted by CSOs on behalf of the Turkish diasporic community, will increase charitable donations and the amount of voluntary work time given to charity. The World Bank (2019a) also provides an indication that Turkish government engagement with CSOs, including charity giving and voluntary work, is economically beneficial. Turkey's civic minded diaspora are more welcomed abroad.

For most of the period since 2000, Turkey has maintained a long-term focus on implementing ambitious reforms in many areas, and government programs have targeted vulnerable groups and disadvantaged regions. Poverty incidence more than halved over 2002-15, and extreme poverty fell even faster. (The World Bank, 2019a; see also The World Bank, 2019b)

Turkey is recognized as being supportive not just in (re)integrating the Turkish diaspora, but also in equally assisting Syrian refugees. As part of the EU backed initiatives, Turkey has enabled the United Nations Development Program (UNPD) to deliver its response strategy to the Syrian refugee crisis (UNPD, 2016, p. 2). The UNDP response is area-based, designed to strengthen existing local and national infrastructure, to be able to cope with the additional influx of Syrian refugees. Local housing, transport, education, and labor markets, are all affected by a sudden increase in calls to access Turkey's social infrastructure. The UNDP's approach to refugees in several countries including Turkey, mirrors Turkey's action plans to help support Turkish diasporic communities. These are people who may have suddenly returned home en masse. The
policy alignment of Turkey’s urbanization priorities, now includes access to social goods e.g., public housing and transport (International Organization for Migration, 2018, p. 326). A large influx can occur after an environmental catastrophe, change of government, civil war, or a military coup in the host country. After such events, which can occur in a rapid disorderly fashion, the new regime may not make Turkey’s diaspora feel welcome anymore. Turkey is able to provide basic social protection for its refugee populations and its returning Turkish diasporic communities when required. Turkey in collaboration with the UNDP and to a lesser extent the EU has social resilience, now being in a state of (re)integration preparedness (European Commission, 2019, p. 3).

Conclusion

This paper demonstrates that the political and social policy drivers that influence diasporic communities are multi-faceted, none more so than with Turkey’s diaspora. Turkey has one of the highest diaspora rates in the world, reflecting the net increase in global migration since 2000. This could be due to climate change or resource scarcity, manifest in the form of food or heating fuel shortages. Pedrosa and Palop-García’s (2017, pp. 169–170) EMIX framework was seen to be in operation. EMIX is clearly visible by the number of causal factors e.g., citizenship, economic, cultural, and social policies, which shape the Turkish diasporic activity. Similarly, Regazzi’s (2014, pp. 77–78) ‘active and supplementary variables’ are also in evidence.

Strong notions of Turkey citizenship and suffrage are evident by the number of Turkish nationals who have voted in Turkey’s general elections since 2000 (Pedrosa & Palop-Garcia, 2017, pp. 169–170; Regazzi, 2014, pp. 77–78). Clicktivism appears to be a significant social actor, being able to provide both suffrage and political competition to state and non-state views. Turkey’s diaspora is able to access alternative views via social network digital platforms, and subsequently politically engage in Turkey’s political affairs. Clicktivism is a really important so-
cial actor which has enabled diaspora people thousands of miles away, to become politically mobilized in their homeland. Without clicktivism, people would be politically disenfranchised, excluded from elections or political democratization initiatives taking place in their mother country.

Institutional participation, cultural, and symbolic policies have featured in this discussion paper (Pedrosa & Palop-Garcia, 2017, pp. 169–170; Regazzi, 2014, pp. 77–78). Joint Turkey and German government support of mosques built by DITIB and/or DIYANET, demonstrate how effective the Turkish diaspora have been in raising Turkey’s profile (Ozturk, 2018, p. 8). Places of worship are important cultural institutions, and symbolically help state actors demonstrate to followers of a majority faith that they have political support. The appearance of policy failure, with continuing human rights critiques regarding domestic repression of some religious or political minority groups, is slowly being addressed. The Turkish government is fully embracing joint work with NGOs and CSOs, who have a remit regarding (re)integrating Turkey’s diaspora at home. This is evidence of the ethnic affiliation hypothesis and governmentality hypothesis in action (Regazzi, 2014, pp. 77–78). This development work mainly with Turkish millennials and adults below the age of 30, will facilitate a process of reducing ethnic minority discrimination and ghettoization. Continuing social justice reforms will help finalize Turkey’s EU accession, which in turn will help cement Turkey’s continuance in NATO.

The Turkish government clearly intends to implement improving social policy regarding rights of non-violent assembly; the ability to vote in regular free and fair elections; an independent judiciary; national radio and TV organizations who are free from political interference; and the provision of basic social protection (Pedrosa & Palop-Garcia, 2017, pp. 169–170). The Turkish government’s intention, although not full realized, is evidence that Turkey wishes to reduce its state and bureaucratic control still further (Regazzi, 2014, pp. 77–78). A substantial amount of the infrastructure is in place. Unfortunately for Turkish citizens, there has been insufficient political will to turn these social policy obligations into
reality. Turkey is in a state of constant preparedness to be able to deliver its obligations to Turkish diasporic communities. These are Turkish nationals who are fleeing an emergency that has arisen in their host country and now wish to return home. Analysis indicates that there may be differing exit and transit policies for Turkey’s diaspora members who are deemed to be elite (Pedrosa & Palop-Garcia, 2017, pp. 169–170; Mencutek & Baser, 2018, p. 88). These Turkish citizens could be highly qualified skilled workers, desperately needed to work on major development in Turkey e.g., the GAP project. Turkish international students with fewer commitments are also viewed as elite, due to their flexibility in being able to move to different parts of Turkey. Highly qualified skilled workers and overseas Turkish students, are often classed as kinship members of Turkey’s diasporic communities (Aydin, 2016, p. 16; Mencutek & Baser, 2018, p. 93).

Turkey’s economy, although still frail, is improving. We have seen how the current account deficit fell significantly from April 2018, when compared with April 2019. This is evidence that Turkey is positioning itself economically, to be able to deliver more public goods for its people (Regazzi, 2014, pp. 77–78). It must not be forgotten that other economic indicators may not have been so favorable for the same period. Turkey has recently made some macroeconomic policy changes in its property market. In 2018 the required qualification level of holding investments valued at $1 million USD, was cut to $250,000 USD. This has enabled more foreign investors to gain Turkish citizenship. The change in economic policy has proved successful as more foreign currency is flowing through Turkey (Caglayan, 2019).

There have been Turkish government discussions to support Turkish culture in the form of performing arts. Turkish artists would benefit from more flexible visa and passport arrangements, enabling them to travel more easily from country to country to perform. There have also been Turkish government discussions to reform economic policies to reduce Turkey’s performing artist’s taxation, in line with remittance payments. Turkish artists would send a minimum amount of foreign currency back
to the Turkish government per period. In return Turkish artists touring abroad would receive a reduced tax liability. The Turkish government's suggestion is evidence of a structural-instrumental economic intervention (Regazzi, 2014, pp. 77-78). A by-product of such changes in economic policy, is that it will make a small contribution to Turkey's exports. Culturally, international success of Turkish artists will help raise awareness of the quality and richness of Turkey’s culture. Domestically, there will be more social and political impetus that Turkish artistic treasures must be preserved. It is culturally important that Turkey's art e.g., songs, dance, and theatre are performed and protected, so they are not forgotten or lost for good (see UNESCO, 2020).

Turkey uses its asymmetrical dominant relationship with its diasporic communities in a constructive, not oppressive way (See Mecutek & Baser, 2018, p. 89).\textsuperscript{15} Turkey's government does use its geopolitical power and influence to shape its diaspora policy. This is to ensure that Turkish citizens benefit whilst abroad, can return home if they so choose, and the policy works equally for most groups. The Turkish government is all too aware that at times, the intention of non-discrimination does not always materialize. Integration and consultation work is constantly ongoing with NGOs, CSOs and Turkey's young population. In the long term a multicultural society for all minority groups, whether Turkish diasporic or not, will be delivered. It is recognized by the Turkish government, that these societal changes cannot come soon enough. For balance it must also be recognized by international observers, that a nation state must protect its citizens and cannot accept terrorism (European Commission, 2019, p. 2).

Notes
1) The Ozaltin et al. article discusses a post-Saddam Iraq landscape, where incidents of political and religious groups have been recorded since the year 2000.
2) Bambo Charalambous is a Member of Parliament in the UK House of Commons. The Hansard article is a transcript of a Westminster Hall debate, where amendments cannot be tabled and votes cannot take place.
3) Globalization 101 is an internet resource offered by the State University of New York (SUNY). Globalization 101 moved to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in 2006; before moving to the Levin Institute, an independent graduate institute of international relations in September 2007.

4) Edith Hall is a Professor in the Classics Department and Centre for Hellenic Studies at King’s College London. Hall’s expertise is in ancient Greece. Hall’s argument clearly applies to both Greek and Turkey’s diaspora.

5) Altay Atli is a lecturer at Koc University in Istanbul and a partner at Reanda Turkey.

6) Akaay and Alimukhamedov’s (2013) work referenced earlier in the text, describes a form of self-imposed ghettoization. UK Turkish diaspora appear to have settled in mainly three neighbourhood districts in London.

7) Gurini’s (2019) article is mainly concerning the effect of the Syrian War on various Turkish minority regions. The issues reported in the article could also apply to Turkey diasporic communities living in their areas.

8) This United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) project document focuses upon a number of intended outcomes for vulnerable groups in the Southeast Anatolia Region. Turkey’s diaspora in this region can be considered as vulnerable groups. This UNDP document is undated: However the following discourse suggests the document was probably published in 2009. “The unemployment rate was 12.3% in November 2008, and is expected to be higher in the first quarter of 2009” (UNDP, 2009, p. 14).

9) This International Crisis Project Report is an analysis of Sri Lankan diaspora.

10) Dilek “Dee” Ertukel is a founder of the Checks and Balances Network, a CSO in Turkey.

11) This Ozturk (2018) reference item, was first published online January 17, 2019. The article was updated on April 30, 2019, which is the version used in this discussion paper.

12) CIDOB is the acronym for the Barcelona Centre for International Affairs. Note 18 was written in collaboration with ESAD/Egeo, a Centre for Global Economy and Geopolitics. ESAD/Egeo is chaired by Dr Javier Solana, former EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy.

13) Christ and Burritt’s article focusing upon modern slavery in Australia, provides examples in Turkey.

14) Makovsky’s article informs us that occasionally Syrian refugees are being exploited by Turkish employers, in relationships which are effectively a form of modern slavery.

15) Mencutck and Bascr (2018) “Mobilizing Diasporas” study, also describes how in some developing countries e.g., Armenia, diaspora communities are the dominant partner, not the mother land. This could be for reasons of reliance on overseas remittances for valuable foreign currency; or that social protection payments are more generous in the host country than in their home country.
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